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Abstract: This article envisions pro-active software components on personalized 
smart devices with wireless communication, e.g. PDAs, smart clothing or embed-
ded automobile devices that move with the user. In changing electronic commerce 
environments, these agents might be able to buy and sell autonomously on behalf 
of their human owner. From a system perspective, a decentralized and continu-
ously changing multi-agent system is created with the need for coordination of 
supply and demand. In this article we show how such a multi-agent system may be 
decentrally coordinated using a bottom-up MAS approach, where software agents 
bargain with each other under the constraints of incomplete information, non-
equilibrium and time pressure. It can be shown that the multi-agent system as a 
whole shows emergent coordination in absence of a centralized coordination in-
stitution. 
Keywords: Automated Negotiation, Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, Digital 
Business Agents, Market Coordination, Multi-Agent Systems 
1  Using Software Agents on Smart Devices 
Tomorrow’s software agents might be the main software component of personal-
ized smart devices with wireless communication capabilities. Such smart devices 
in the context of "ubiquitous computing" [Weis91] or "pervasive computing" are 
envisioned to embed the Internet in mobile phones, smart sensors, smart clothes, 
building materials, car electronics and so on [EsGo00]. These devices are mostly 
considered to passively collect information from the environment or centralized 
web servers and display this information to the human user. But there is just a 
small step to have them actively pursuing a goal, according to given preferences 
and an adaptive strategy. These autonomous devices can be either stationary, such 
as a refrigerator which buys food [Kahn99], or a water heater which buys electric-
ity [Ygge98]. They can also be mobile, such as a PDA-based shopping agent 
[YoMo00], or a car-based electronic toll payment device [DeAr00]. 
Instead of constant interaction between human owners of such devices, responsi-
bility to conduct these economic transactions may be handed over to software 
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agents: software that acts autonomously in some environment to fulfill its design 
goals [Wool99]. These agents will monitor other agents and the environment con-
tinuously, watching for potential opportunities to fulfill their design goals. They 
will be able to enter into negotiation with many potential trade partners at once, 
reaching an acceptable deal and setting up a contract in a matter of milliseconds 
[GuMa98; Prei98]. In the remainder of this article, we focus on negotiating soft-
ware agents in business environments, regardless of them being Internet- or PDA-
based, which we call “Digital Business Agents” (DBAs). DBAs will assist human 
buyers and sellers in digital business processes and environments, which are char-
acterized by trading and money transactions. 
The research question pursued in this article is how different adaptive negotiation 
strategies of DBAs compete against each other in such an unregulated environ-
ment, and the impact on the coordination of the environment as a whole. In the 
next chapter, we describe the technical requirements and the setup of a multi-agent 
system (MAS) that coordinates a model supply chain process using decentralized 
economic coordination. Some experiments with different bargaining strategies in 
the DBAs are described in chapter 3. The article concludes in chapter 4 with an 
outlook into possible application areas and the problems of linking economic con-
cepts and technical realization of market coordination. 





Wood Board Panel Table 
 
Figure 1: A simple supply chain scenario. 
In order to evaluate the future impact and functionality of agent-driven coordina-
tion issues, a prototypical market-coordinated MAS named AVALANCHE has been 
designed. Here, DBAs represent human users intending to buy, produce and sell 
different goods or services as “miniature automated businesses” [KeHa00]. A sim-
ple and arbitrary supply chain is modeled in which three different types of DBAs 
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produce a consumer good: “lumberjacks”, that buy trees to produce and sell 
boards; “carpenters”, that buy the boards and fix them together to sell as a panel; 
and “cabinetmakers”, that buy the panels, build tables out of them and sell them. 
Two additional types, producers and consumers, which only define a seller or 
buyer strategy, respectively, provide the tight ends of the supply chain. This sce-
nario serves as a blueprint for a specific class of typical information system appli-
cation environments – it is not considered to be a realistic model of a furniture-
making supply chain. 
2.1  The Technical Setup 
AVALANCHE is realized in JAVA 1.2 and uses the ORB class library VOYAGER 3.0 
[Obje99]. All agents are independent JAVA threads. The system architecture con-
sists of three basic classes, the marketplaces, trader agents, and one experiment 
control object. Both marketplaces and trader agents are initialized simultaneously 
in our experiments, but due to the openness of the architecture, trader agents could 
enter marketplaces at any point in time. Detailed information about AVALANCHE 
can be found in [Eyma00].  
The agent class defines communication abilities and negotiation protocols (in the 
remainder of this paper, we use the terms “agent”, “software agent” and “DBA” 
synonymously). Each agent communicates with every other object on the market-
place in direct, bilateral and unmediated fashion. All agents are based on stan-
dardized concepts of JAVA, and distinguishable by a unique identity. 
The electronic marketplaces are based on Java Virtual Machines (JVM), which 
run as a server process in a TCP/IP-based network. In order not to interfere with 
the negotiation process of the software agents, the functions and services of the 
object are kept to a minimum.  The marketplace neither actively influences the 
software agents’ strategies nor the communication – in particular, it does not ex-
plicitly synchronize or schedule the agents’ activities.  It only offers a single 
“white pages” directory service for any software agent to register as seller or 
buyer, and to inquire about other registered agents. Price bids are never publicly 
posted (as in catalogs), since the price information might partly reveal the agent’s 
strategy to competitors and bidders, and prevents the negotiation of individual 
prices per bidder.  
The experiment control object contains technical functions for logging the trans-
action data, which is not expected to have any effect on the market coordination.  
2.2  The Negotiation Protocol 
The key difference of AVALANCHE compared to many other agent-based market-
place projects is the absence of a central arbitrator or auctioneer, and the imple-
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mentation of a strictly decentralized automated negotiation (bargaining) protocol. 
Comparable automated negotiation efforts in multi-agent systems can be found in 
the research context of agent-mediated electronic commerce [GuMa98; Sier00] 
and market-oriented programming [Well96]. 
All agents in AVALANCHE follow the economic goal of profit maximization. They 
try to buy input goods for less and to sell output goods for more. Depending on the 
actual market situation, its equity, and stock, the agent decides autonomously 
which action to take next - whether to buy, sell, produce, move or self-terminate. 
The agent lifecycle “follows the money”: if the agent has finished goods in stock, 
it tries to sell. If the agent has no goods, but input factors in stock, it simulates the 
production of output goods (by waiting an appropriate length of time). If the agent 
has no input factors in stock, it tries to buy some. If the market situation is not 
satisfying at all, e.g. if there are no offers or demands within a certain time span, 
the agent tries to move to another marketplace. If the agent has spent its entire 
budget or all marketplaces are shut down, it has to terminate – every few millisec-
onds the agent has to pay utilization fees to the market anyway, so doing nothing 
is never a dominating strategy. 
In the case of buying or selling, the DBA goes through the three stages of a market 
transaction: information, agreement, and settlement [ScLi98]. In the information 
phase of any transaction, a buyer or seller has to identify its potential trading part-
ners. If a seller agent wants to sell its output, it currently advertises its offer in the 
directory, and waits until a prospective buyer agent demands a negotiation. Simul-
taneously, the agent will actively search in the directory for potential transaction 
partners. Buyer agents apply a mirror procedure. 
The buyer agent then initiates the agreement phase by communicating with any 
supplier from the list. The software agents negotiate using a monotonic concession 
protocol [RoZl94], where propose and counter-propose messages with subsequent 
price concessions are exchanged. If the negotiation process is successful, both 
agents will reach a compromise price agreement; otherwise, someone will sooner 
or later drop out of the negotiation. In this event, the agents will restart with other 
partners obtained from the directory. 
In the final settlement phase, the transaction is carried out and monitored. Sellers 
and buyers exchange goods and money, respectively. If any party misbehaves in 
this phase (by not keeping commitments), the resulting reputation information can 
be used to modify strategies and behavior to be used in future encounters with that 
agent as in [PaSa01], effectively repulsing those agents from the market commu-
nity. 
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2.3  The Agents’ Negotiation Strategy 
The goal of the agents, and the reason to engage in negotiation at all, is to maxi-
mize the spread between materials cost and sales revenue. The agent thus follows 
a certain negotiation strategy, derived from human negotiation behavior, which 
uses parameters such as demand level, concession, and concession rate: 
A bargainer’s demand level can be thought of as the level of benefit to the self as-
sociated with the current offer or demand. A concession is a change of offer in the 
supposed direction of the other party’s interests that reduces the level of benefit 
sought. Concession rate is the speed at which demand level declines over time. […] 
These definitions […are] unproblematic, when only one issue or underlying value 
is being considered, as in a simple wage or price negotiation. [Prui81, p. 19] 
The AVALANCHE agents use an adaptive heuristic strategy based on a non-deter-
ministic finite state automaton (non-det FSM), in which action paths are taken de-
pending on stochastic probes against certain internal parameters. A non-det FSM 
is equivalent to a complex deterministic rulework [HoUl94], but easier to model 
because it has less parameters. In AVALANCHE, a combination of six parameters, 
collectively called the Genotype, describes the strategy in the non-det FSM (see 
below). When an opponent’s offer is received by any agent, the following process 
is carried out.  
The goods that are traded are defined as commodities, so the only negotiation 
variable is the price. The opponent’s price will be extracted and put in relation to 
the subjective market price level, stored in the variable Memory. If the opponent’s 
price is not in the deal range (e.g. below twice the Memory value), the offer will 
be rejected as excessive. Anyway, the offer price will modify Memory by using a 
weighted exponential average with weight w_memory (w_mem). The Satisfaction 
probability parameter (p_sat) is probed next: it determines if an agent will drop 
out from an ongoing negotiation instead of making a counter-proposal. Effec-
tively, this parameter creates time pressure - the more steps the negotiation takes, 
or the more excessive the opponent’s offers are, the more likely it is that the nego-
tiation will be discontinued.  
If the opponent’s offer passes this test, the agent decides to make a counter-pro-
posal. In the next step, the agent has to decide whether to make a concession, and 
if so, what the new offer price should be. Whether an agent concedes in an actual 
situation is subject to a stochastic probe against the reciprocal value of the conces-
sion making probability, called Acquisitiveness (p_acq). The lower the acquisi-
tiveness value, the higher the average concession rate.   
If the agent concedes, the In-negotiation delta price change (del_change) pa-
rameter calculates the amount of the price concession between two negotiation 
steps. Both partners calculate a percentage from the price difference of their origi-
nal offers. If the buyer has del_change = 0.5 and the supplier del_change = 0.0, 
the agents will reach agreement after two negotiation steps at the initial price of 
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the supplier, if no agent drops out. In the next step, the agent sends back his new 
offer and waits for a counter-proposal. This routine will alternatively be carried 
out by the opponents, until compromise is reached or one of the agents leaves the 
negotiation process. 
During the subsequent settlement phase, Reputation (p_rep) affects the agent’s 
probability of behaving cooperatively by exchanging the committed amount of 
goods or money. In this article, all agents are assumed to cooperate (p_rep = 1); 
for other cases, see [PaSa01]. Finally, after each successful negotiation, the agents 
will try to change their initial demand level in their favor, lowering or raising it 
depending on their role as seller or buyer. The percentual value of that change is 
encoded in Pre-negotiation delta price change (del_jump).  
By varying the setting of the Genotype parameters in subsequent experimental 
runs, we can show how dominant parameter combinations either succeed or are 
counterbalanced. Heterogeneity is achieved by a uniform random distribution of 
the initial strategy parameter values, which effectively assigns a different strategy 
to each agent. The "fitness" denominator for the individual agent's strategy is ob-
viously currency: an agent, which is faster and/or fitter in trading than another, 
will have a relatively higher income.  
3  Experimental Results 
To test the behavior of the AVALANCHE system we conduct several test series. 
Every series consists of several experiment runs, which under similar conditions 
lead to comparable outcome patterns. In the current implementation we run a gen-
erator program, an experimental control object, a single marketplace and 50 trad-
ing agents of each type (for a total of 250 agents) in parallel on a Pentium PC un-
der Windows NT for about 10 minutes. The following presentations all show 
similar patterns when repeatedly started with the same initial values. However, 
absolute price levels or points in time have no meaning since they change in every 
run.  
3.1  Markets without Intelligence 
We start with some simple parameter combinations and subsequently move on to 
more complex experiments. The first experiment shows homogenous strategies, 
which means that all agents are equipped with an identical Genotype and there is 
no variation of parameter values in the population. The agents hold no stock, but 
some initial equity money. Every 10 milliseconds a new “wood” is produced by 
any producer agent. The consumer agents never run out of money. Initial goods 
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valuations are preprogrammed equally for every agent type (e.g. 25 money units 
for boards).  
Genotype P_acq del_change del_jump p_sat w_mem p_rep 
Value 0.5 0.25 0.15 0.75 0.2 1.0 
Variance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Table 1: Parameter settings for introductory experiment 
 
Figure 2: Price dynamics using homogeneous strategies 
The presentation charts are explained using the simple picture of Figure 2. The 
horizontal axis measures the time in milliseconds, the vertical axis shows the price 
level. Every dot in the chart points out time and agreement price of a transaction, 
e.g. the x-value of a triangle marks the time when some carpenter software agent 
has sold a table to a cabinetmaker software agent for y-value price. The type of 
goods is represented by different gray scales and symbols as indicated by the leg-
end, which shows the supply chain from top to bottom. In the chart, this succes-
sion has been turned upside down since woods are sold for the lowest price and 
tables for the highest. To make the graphic comparable there is a price ceiling for 
tables at 120 money units, which can be seen in later experiments. The time lag at 
the beginning is caused by software initialization and initial negotiation until the 
first goods are moved up the supply chain.  
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In Figure 2 it is not possible for a single agent to gain an advantage, since all 
agents possess an identical static negotiation strategy. The price levels do not sub-
stantially change during the course of the experiment. The growing variance of the 
goods prices with the supply chain steps seems to be a variant of the bullwhip ef-
fect, common in supply chain management [LePa97]. In the next experiment, the 
carpenter agents are initialized with a “greedier” negotiation strategy than all other 
types.  
Genotype P_acq del_change del_jump p_sat w_mem p_rep 
Value 0.6 for carpenters  
0.5 for other types  
0.25 0.15 0.75 0.2 1.0 
Variance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Table 2: Parameter settings for greedy carpenters 
 
Figure 3: Different concession rates lead to different profits1 
The greediness of only one agent type (carpenters) leads to a picture of winners 
and losers (see Figure 3). Since the other agent types concede faster than the 
carpenters do, the latter are able to increase their income (the spread between 
board prices and panel prices) at the expense of both lumberjacks and cabinetmak-
                                                          
1
  The vertical white stripes in the figure are experimental artifacts caused by the 
Windows NT environment and have no effect on the outcome. 
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ers. It appears to be a dominating strategy to set the agent’s acquisitiveness as high 
as possible, at least higher than any other agent it might trade with, and in fact this 
is where the gains of the carpenters come from. In an environment without evolu-
tionary learning and open markets, the higher acquisitiveness of the carpenters is a 
dominating strategy. However, most of these experiments abort early, because the 
lumberjacks and cabinetmakers run out of money and are thus not able to continue 
the supply chain – in this case, the victory was short-lived. 
3.2  Introducing Evolutionary Learning in the Market 
The negotiation profit gained from a specific Genotype is correlated to the relative 
setting of other agent’s strategies, not the absolute values. “Learning” the right 
values relative to the other agents is thus essential to gain a higher profit in the 
future. In Figure 3, the inability of the agents to change their strategy affects both 
winners and losers – the other agents should raise their own acquisitiveness set-
ting, while the carpenters could lower their setting to conduct more transactions 
within the same time. 
If we move towards a more realistic and heterogeneous setting, we can show how 
the application of a feedback learning mechanism can emergently control the sys-
tem. Our approach uses a decentralized evolutionary algorithm taken from 
[SmTa98], which is based on gossip information about the success of transactions. 
In AVALANCHE, every agent sends a "plumage" object after a successful transac-
tion, advertising its average income and its genes to one random agent of the same 
type. This can be interpreted as someone receiving gossip or insider information 
about an otherwise private deal information of someone else. Upon having re-
ceived a fixed number of plumages, every agent ranks them and selects the plum-
age with the highest average income attached. This plumage will then be crossed 
over with the agent’s own strategy genes, and "planted" into a new agent which 
then enters the marketplace.  That way the evolutionary algorithm relegates un-
successful agents/strategies and promotes successful agents/strategies, changing 
the composition of the population over time. 
Figure 3 has shown how heterogeneous strategies of the agents affected the overall 
behavior of the system, in case there is no evolution. In contrast, Figure 4 shows 
the results of an experiment where economic effects are combined with EC-like 
interactions between agents. The carpenters were, as before, equipped with a 
lesser probability to make price concessions, and this is again evident in the first 
half of the experiment run: the spread between the second (boards) and third (pan-
els) price curve increases. But this time, the lumberjack and cabinetmaker agents 
are (after some time) not only able to withstand the pressure, but to turn the tables 
and to dominate the carpenter agents. This is graphically displayed in Figure 5, 
where every curve represents the average acquisitiveness values of a specific 
agent type over time. The highest curve at the beginning represents the carpenters, 
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and one can see that their initially high average of the acquisitiveness parameter 
soon declines too much. 
After the first half of the experiment, the carpenters end up with the lowest setting 
of all three inner agent types. At the same time, the lumberjack and cabinetmaker 
agents are able to co-evolve and raise their acquisitiveness setting. At around 1500 
seconds in the earlier Figure 4, the spread between board and panel prices had fi-
nally vanished and with it the profits of the carpenter agents. In Figure 5 at that 
time, the average acquisitiveness setting of the carpenter agents reaches the lowest 
value compared to the other agent types. 
Genotype P_acq del_change del_jump p_sat w_mem p_rep 
Value 0.6 for carpenters 
0.5 for other types  
0.25 0.15 0.75 0.2 1.0 
Variance 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Table 3: Parameter settings for co-evolutionary greediness 
This picture changes again in the second half of both charts, when the cabinet-
maker agents learn and raise their acquisitiveness again. Similar to the beginning, 
now the cabinetmaker, and to a lesser extent, the lumberjack agents reduce their 
acquisitiveness values as shown in Figure 5. The result can be immediately seen in 
Figure 4: the carpenter agents gain ground, the lumberjack agents are able to with-
stand the pressure and keep their profit situation, and the cabinetmaker agents lose 
everything gained in the first half of the experiment run. In summary, a highly dy-
namic pattern of co-evolution arises, where learning successful parameter settings 
allows other participants to survive and prosper early while dominating strategies 
are counterbalanced. Because the size and strategies of the population constantly 
change, this result will probably never reach a static endpoint, like an evolutionary 
function optimizer does. 
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Figure 4: Price Level Development with Evolution. 
 
Figure 5: Evolutionary development of the acquisitiveness parameter 
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4  Market Coordination between Economic Concepts 
and Technical Realization 
Most future visions of ubiquitous computing are mainly hardware-centric and fo-
cus on humans interacting through otherwise non-intelligent mobile devices. But 
to reduce transaction costs, human users will rely on pro-active, device-based 
software agents to conduct a majority of economic transactions in the background, 
without human intervention (cf. “silent commerce” [Sche00]). In a electronic com-
merce context, device-based comparison shoppers allow automated price compari-
sons between different suppliers [YoMo00]. As counter-strategy, sellers are ex-
pected to begin to dynamically post prices to negotiate with individual buyers 
[KeHa00]. As a result, a complex, decentralized network of selfish trading soft-
ware agents emerges, which needs coordination to prevent chaos. 
This article introduced a coordination mechanism for systems of autonomous de-
centralized devices, based on constant negotiation and price signaling. Related 
work can be found in both agent technology and economics, notably agent-based 
computational economics [Tesf97], to develop new technical possibilities of 
coordinating decentralized information systems consisting of autonomous soft-
ware agents. This article shows, how a self-regulating market approach exhibits 
certain coordination patterns and leads to a co-evolution of strategies. If the agents 
are able to learn and revise their strategies, a stabilization of price curves can be 
achieved. As a result, adaptivity of strategies is regarded as a key requirement for 
software entities in the context of ubiquitous computing, especially in e-commerce 
scenarios – in a broader sense, adaptive strategies are required for all multi-agent 
systems consisting of selfish, economic-goal driven agents. 
The findings of this article are only the beginning and clearly need further discus-
sion, especially concerning the link between economic understanding and techno-
logical realization of market coordination. Some research topics still remain un-
solved. It is desired to design mechanisms for self-interested agents such that if 
agents maximize their local utility, the overall system behavior will at least be ac-
ceptable [Binm92]. Among the problems which such a complex system faces are 
the over-usage of a shared resource known as “tragedy of the commons” 
[Hard68], chaotic behavior [HuHo88; ThSy98], and the appearance of malevolent 
agents, which may be countered by the embodiment of centralized and decentral-
ized reputation mechanisms in the system [PaSa01]. These problems have to be 
watched closely, because they will determine appearance and acceptance of de-
centralized systems consisting of autonomous devices.  
However, a successful implementation of the distributed resource allocation 
mechanism introduced here has the advantage of a flexible structure and inherent 
parallel processing. From an application viewpoint, an appealing aspect lies in the 
inherently distributed structure, which mirrors the division of work in companies 
and the network of businesses and markets. By using the same coordination rules 
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that govern the real world, decentralized market mechanisms may allow the crea-
tion of innovative fast, flexible, parallel working, and self-regulating IT systems. 
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